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Recent Decisions
SLAYER'S ACT-JOINT TENANCY-PARTITION BY CREDITOR-THE Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania has held that an execution sale of a
slayer's jointly held property constitutes a severance of the joint tenancy
and the buyer at such sale takes a fee interest in the property purchased
free from the right of survivorship which had previously existed in the
decedent's estate.
Larendon Estate, 439 Pa. 535, 266 A.2d 763 (1970).
Robert B. Dalton and John R. Larendon, the decedent, purchased and
took title to certain tracts of land in Chester County, Pennsylvania as
joint tenants with the right of survivorship. On December 7, 1960,
Larendon was murdered by Dalton; a conviction followed. After
Larendon's death, but prior to conviction, a judgment was entered
against Dalton, the accused murderer. This judgment was executed
and the appellant, Isadore Dresner, purchased at a sheriff's sale Dalton's
interest in the property.' The administrator of Larendon's estate would
not allow Dresner to take possession of the property. Therefore, Dresner
sought a declaratory judgment "as to the nature and extent of the in-
terest in the property which Dalton had had and he (Dresner) had pur-
chased."' 2 The lower court 3 held that due to the provisions of the
Slayer's Act 4 of Pennsylvania Dalton's interest was only a life estate.
Dresner by purchasing this interest acquired a life estate pur autre vie
measured by the life of Dalton. Upon appeal the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed the lower court decision. 5
I. A sale upon an execution of a judgment lien on a joint tenant's interest in joint
property is sufficient to operate as a severance of the joint tenancy. Re Erie Trust Co.,
19 Erie Co. L. J. 469 (1938), 161 A.L.R. 1139, 1140 (1946). It has been uniformally held
in all jurisdictions that a "mere judgment lien against the interest of a joint tenant in
joint property is not, of itself, sufficient to operate as a severance of the joint tenancy."
Id. at 1139.
2. 439 Pa. 535, 266 A.2d 763 (1970).
3. Larendon Estate, 16 Ches. Co. Rep. 181 (1968), rev'd, 439 Pa. 535, 266 A.2d 763
(1970).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3446(a), 3448 (1941). Section 3446(a) provides:
One-half of any property held by the slayer and the decedent as joint tenants, joint
owners or joint obligees shall pass upon the death of the decedent to his estate, and
the other half shall pass to his estate upon the death of the slayer, unless the slayer
obtains a separation or severance oj the property or decree granting partition. (Em-
phasis Added).
Section 3448 provides:
Any interest in property, whether vested or not, held by the slayer, subject to be
divested, diminished in any way or extinguished, if the decedent survives him or lives
to a certain age, shall be held by the slayer during his lifetime or until the decedent
would have reached such age, but shall then pass as if the decedent had died im-
mediately thereafter.
5. 439 Pa. 535, 266 A.2d 763 (1970).
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Mr. Justice Pomeroy, 6 speaking for the majority, reasoned that the
Slayer's Act7 did not extinguish the slayer's right to partition his interest
in the property. Therefore, the sale upon execution of the judgment
lien against Dalton was sufficient to effect a partition of the joint ten-
ancy.8 Dalton and Larendon became tenants in common. As a tenant in
common, Dalton had an undivided fee interest in one half of the prop-
erty.9 It was this interest that the court said Dresner had obtained. The
court stated:
[T]here is no indication, express or implied, that the Act is meant
to extinguish any property right enjoyed by the slayer at the time of
his misdeed nor should it be construed to have the effect unless
necessary. 10
To fully understand the impact of this decision it is necessary to ex-
amine the evolution of the Slayer's Act. 1
In the absence of a statute four approaches are taken by the courts in
dealing with a slayer's rights in joint tenancies. The first view allows the
entire right of survivorship benefits on the ground that each tenant is
deemed to be seized of the whole for the purposes of survivorship from
the time of the original conveyance.' 2
The second view denies the right of survivorship to the slayer. The
basis for this approach is the equitable maxim which states that one
should not be allowed to benefit through his own wrongdoing. In these
jurisdictions there is a presumption that the victim would have survived
but for his wrongful act.""
The third view deals with the concept of the constructive trust. Under
this approach the slayer receives title to the decedent's interest by opera-
tion of his right of survivorship. However, a constructive trust is im-
posed, and the slayer is made a constructive trustee of the property and
holds it for the estate of the decedent.' 4
The fourth view treats the act of the slayer as an act of severance.
6. Dissenting opinions were filed by Mr. Justice Cohen and Mr. Chief Justice Bell.
7. See note 4.
8. See note 1.
9. 382 Pa. 411, 115 A.2d 197 (1955).
10. 493 Pa. 535, 266 A.2d 763, 765 (1970).
11. See note 4.
12. Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950); Oleff v. Hodapp, 129
Ohio 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935); Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939);
Beddingfield v. Estill and Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1906).
13. Merrity v. Prudential Ins. C., 110 N.J.L. 414, 166 A. 335 (1935); Bierbraur v.
Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 NYS. 176 (1935); In Re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 688,
212 NYS. 116 (1925); In Re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952).
14. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188 (1937); 4 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 493.2 (3rd ed. 1967).
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This causes the joint tenancy to become a tenancy in common. The
slayer gets one half of the property while the decedent's estate gets the
other half.15
Prior to statutory provisions dealing with a slayer's rights in jointly
owned property, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania followed the first
view as discussed above. In Carpenter's Estate,16 a father was murdered
by his son, in order that the son might get immediate possession of the
decedent's estate under the statute of distributions. The court would
not take the inheritance from the murderer. The rationale of the court
follows:
The intestate law in the plainest words designates the persons who
shall succeed to the estates of the deceased intestates. It is impossible
for the courts to designate any different persons to take such estates
without violating the law. 17
In dealing with the effect of the equitable principle that one should not
be permitted to benefit through his own wrongdoing, the court stated
that to deny the son his interest in the inheritance would be a punish-
ment for his wrongful act. To effectuate such an end they said "the law
must fix punishments; the courts cannot impose them."' 8 From Car-
penter it was obvious that a statute concerning a slayer's interest was
needed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Statutory provisions dealing with this matter were first introduced in
Pennsylvania through the Wills and Intestate Acts of 1917.19 These two
statutes remedied the situation of Carpenter.20 However, there was a
flaw in their construction which would cause problems at a later date.21
This was due to the fact that the Wills and Intestate Acts of 1917 spe-
15. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill.2d 106, 129
NE.2d 699 (1955); Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948).
16. 170 Pa. 203, 32 A. 637 (1895).
17. Id. at 203, 32 A. at 637.
18. Id. at 203, 32 A. at 637.
19. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 244 (1917) provides:
No person who shall be finally adjudged guilty, either as principle or accessory, of
murder of the first or second degree, shall be entitled to take any part of the real
or personal estate of the person killed, as devisee or legatee, or otherwise, under the
will of such person.
Id. section 136 provides:
No person who shall be finally adjudged guilty, either as principle or accessory,
of murder of the first or second degree, shill be entitled to inherit or take part of
the real or personal estate of the person killed, as surviving spouse, heir, or next
of kin to such person under the provisions of this act.
20. 170 Pa. 203, 32 A. 637 (1895). According to the Wills and Interstate Acts of 1917
the son would not take under his inheritance from his father since he was "finally
adjudged guilty . . . of [the] murder" of his father.
21. See Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139 (1934).
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cifically stated that the slayer must be "finally adjudged guilty . .. o f
murder." In Tarlo's Estate22 a father killed his wife and daughter and
then commited suicide. Here the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled
that because the father commited suicide, he was never "finally ad-
judged guilty... of murder." Therefore, the provisions of the Intestate
Act of 1917 did not apply to the Tarlo situation. In its opinion, the
court once again put the burden upon the legislature. The court said:
If the law is to be changed so as to cover the situation before us, it
is for the legislature to make the change, not for us. 23
Because of decisions such as Tarlo a model statute24 was drafted for
the purpose of denying a slayer an interest in property which he could
receive through his misdeed. This model statute was substantially
adopted by the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1941 in the form of the
Slayer's Act.25 This is the statute which governed the decision in
Larendon.
Through viewing the history of the Slayer's Act in Pennsylvania it
seems that a question arises as to the validity of the decision in Laren-
don. Should a partition or severance of a slayer's interest in a joint
tenancy be permitted after he commits a felonious homicide? The court
said that the severance should be permitted. However, this seems to be
inconsistent with the purpose of the act. Mr. Justice Pomeroy states that
the act is not meant to extinguish any property right enjoyed by the
slayer at the time of his crime "unless necessary. '26 (Emphasis added.)
It is submitted that under the facts of Larendon it is necessary to deny
the slayer his right of partition or severance. The statute was enacted
in order to deny a slayer from benefiting from his wrongful act.27 The
legislative intent as construed by the court was set forth in Kravitz
Estate.2
8
22. 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139 (1934).
23. Id. at 326, 172 A. at 141.
24. Wade, Acquisition of Property By Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution,
49 HARv. L. REV. 715 (1936). According to Wade, the purpose of this model statute was
to give effect to the equitable maxim. "that no one should be allowed to profit by his
own wrong." The article points out that some jurisdictions will not apply the maxim
because it would be contrary to an existing statute. Since courts are quite wary about
"legislating," the maxim is disregarded. This is basically the problem which prevailed
in Pennsylvania prior to the Wills and Interstate Acts of 1917. See Charpenter's Estate,
170 Pa. 203, 32 A. 637 (1895).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3441-3456 (1941).
26. 439 Pa. 535, 266 A.2d 763, 765 (1970).
27. See Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 A. 637 (1895); Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321,
172 A. 139 (1934).
28. 418 Pa. 316, 327, 211 A.2d 443, 447 (1965).
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The intent of the legislature and language of the Slayer's Act are,
we believe, clear-a person convicted of murder is not entitled to
receive any property of the person he (or she) wilfully or unlaw-
fully killed.
There are also overlapping slayer's provisions in the Wills Act and in
the Intestate Act of 1947.29 These statutes specifically state that the
slayer should not receive benefits of the property due to his unlawful
killing. By allowing Dalton to have the joint tenancy severed, a definite
benefit was confered upon him. He could now convey a one-half fee
interest in the property which he formerly held as a joint tenant. It is
submitted that this is a definite economic benefit to the slayer. The
decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Larendon seems to be
contrary to the evolution of the Slayer's Act, and the overlaping pro-
visions of the Wills and Intestate Acts of 1947. It also seems to be con-
trary to the legislative purpose as stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Kravitz Estate. The reason for this is that according to section
3446 of the Slayer's Act, when Dalton killed Larendon he automatically
lost his right of survivorship. The survivorship became vested in the
estate of the decedent, Larendon. In short Dalton received a life inter-
est in his portion of the property.30 By allowing Dalton to partition his
interest, he was then permitted to have a fee interest instead of merely
a life estate.
The majority opinion in Larendon notes that the act provides that the
slayer loses his right of survivorship, "unless the slayer obtains a separa-
tion or severance of the property or a decree granting partition."3 ' If
this clause is construed to allow the slayer to have a severance after his
29. The Wills Act provides:
(5) Slaying. Any person who participates either as a principle or as an accessory
before the fact in the wilful and unlawful killing of any person shall not in any
way acquire property or receive an benefits as the result of the wilful and unlawful
killing but such property or benefts shall be distributed as provided by law. (Em-
phasis Added). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7(5) (1947).
The provisions of the Intestate Act are substantially the same as that of the Wills
Act. Id. § 1.6(c) (1947).
30. This result seems to be further supported by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3448. This
section of the Slayer's Act provides:
Any, interest in property, whether vested or not, held by the slayer, subject to be
divested, diminished in any way or extinguished, if the decedent survives him or
lives to a certain age, shall be held by the slayer during his lifetime or until the
decedent would have reached such age, but shall then pass as if the decedent had died
immediately thereafter..
It will be noted that this section of the statute seems to bring about the same result
as the theory of the constructive trust which has been followed in several jurisdictions
which do not have a statutory slayer's provision. Supra note 14.
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3446(a) (1941).
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criminal act (as the court did in Larendon), it will defeat the purpose
of the act as discussed above.
An examination of the authority in jurisdictions other than Pennsyl-
vania may help to illustrate why permitting a severance of a joint ten-
ancy, as the court permitted in Larendon, is not the best solution to the
problem. Concerning a joint tenancy, the Restatement of Restitution 32
takes the position that even if a partition is compelled, the slayer is only
entitled to a one-half interest for life. Under this view the slayer actually
takes the entire interest in the property upon the death of the decedent.
However, he is compelled to hold the interest upon a constructive trust
for the estate of the deceased co-tenant. The only thing he is entitled to
is one-half of the income for his life. The result here seems to be desir-
able since the slayer cannot benefit through the killing yet he is not
being denied any interest he previously held in the property.
This same position has also been followed by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin. In In Re King's Estate3" a husband and wife held property
as joint tenants. The husband murdered the wife and then commited
suicide. Counsel for the estate of the husband argued that the act of
murder effected a severance of the joint tenancy. The court rejected
this argument holding that the interest of the husband after murder
was a life estate which ended when he commited suicide. The remainder
of the interest vested in the estate of the wife. In support of this con-
clusion the court said, "enjoyment must be preserved, but it cannot be
enlarged by his unlawful act."3 4 It is generally conceded that if the
slayer had obtained a partition or severance of the joint tenancy prior to
his act he would be permitted to retain his entire one-half interest. This
is because his interest would not have been enlarged by the murder.35
32. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Explanatory Notes § 188, Comment b at 774 (1938).
Section 188 provides:
Where two persons have an interest in property and the interest of one of them is
enlarged by the murder of the other, to the extent to which it is enlarged he holds
it upon a constructive trust for the estate of the other.
Comment b provides:
Murder by Co-owner. If one tenant in common murders the other, no constructive
trust will be imposed upon the murderer since his interest is not derived from or
increased by the murder. The situation is different where there are two joint tenants
and the principle of survivorship is applicable. In such a case if one of them murders
the other, the murderer takes by survivorship the whole legal interest in the property,
but he can be compelled to hold the entire interest upon a constructive trust for
the estate of his co-tenant, except that he is entitled to one-half of the income for
life. It is immaterial that each of them might have compelled a partition before
the death of either. (Emphasis Added).
33. 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952).
34. Id. at - , 52 N.W.2d at 888 (1952).
35. 4 ScoTT, TRUST § 493.2 (3d ed. 1967).
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* In addition to the maximum that one should not be permitted to
benefit through his own wrongdoing, other rationales have been ex-
pressed which seem to imply that the result in Larendon may be er-
roneous. One author has put forth the opinion that all doubts should
be resolved against the slayer since it was his unlawful act which raised
problems for the courts.a6 If the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had to
interpret the effect of provision 3446 of the Pennsylvania Slayer's Act it
probably should have construed it in a light unfavorable to the slayer.
If this provision were interpreted against the slayer he would have only
had a life interest. However, the decision of the court awarded him a
fee interest. Perhaps Lord Justice Fry best expressed the reason why a
slayer should not be permitted to sever a joint tenancy after his wrong-
ful act. He said:
It appears to me that no system of jurisprudence can with reason
include amongst the rights which it enforces rights directly result-
ing to the person asserting them from the crime of that person.37
In reviewing the evolution of the law dealing with a slayer's interest
in jointly held property it seems that the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has allowed the slayer to benefit through his own wrong. If this
was the only avenue open to the court this decision might have been
easier to reconcile. However, through the views of several legal scholars,
and the decisions in other jurisdictions, it is submitted that a more
equitable result could have been reached.
HENRY S. PERKIN
36. 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963 (1956). This is a case note dealing with Bradly v. Fox, 129
N.E.2d 699 (INl. 1955). In this case the defendant and decedent were husband and wife.
They held the property in dispute as joint tenants. The husband murdered his wife and
then attempted to convey the entire property to his attorney in payment of his counsel
on the murder charge. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the act of the husband
terminated his right of survivorship and caused a severance in the joint tenancy giving
the husband an undivided one-half interest. This case note analyzes and criticizes the
Illinois court's decision.
37. Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, I Q.B. 147, 156 (1892).
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